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Abstract 
Big claims that are often unsubstantiated are made about the likely impact of Brexit on the UK 
labour market. This paper seeks to go beyond the rhetoric and present a careful assessment of 
the employment relations consequences of Brexit for the UK. It addresses four key questions 
in particular: will Brexit end UK engagement in the EU’s free movement of labour regime and 
if so what will be the labour market consequences for the UK?; to what extent will Brexit 
weaken employment rights in the UK?; what impact will Brexit have on the behaviour of trade 
unions and on the functioning of collective bargaining in the UK?; and finally what will be the 
effect of Brexit on the interactions between London and Brussels on wider employment policy 
questions. The paper argues that Brexit poses acute policy dilemmas for the UK Government 
that are likely to generate considerable political and economic uncertainty. The fallout from 
this uncertainty is hard to predict in advance. It could either open the door to a Corbyn-led 
Labour Government or alternatively to an even more thorough-going deregulation of the UK 
















In June 2016, the UK voted by a small majority to leave the European Union. So-called 
“Brexiteers” rejoiced, proclaiming that UK citizens had won back control of their country. In 
contrast, “Remainers” portrayed the vote as calamitous, arguing that it represented a 
momentous act of national self-harm.  Whether the UK is on the edge of the abyss or nirvana 
has framed nearly all assessments about the consequences of Brexit, not least discussions about 
the implications for workers’ rights and wider employment relations issues. A prominent and 
sustained argument made by leading Brexit supporters, before and after the referendum, is tha t 
leaving the EU will bring to an end the unwanted intrusion of Brussels into how the UK labour 
market is regulated. On this account, EU membership has resulted in too much labour market 
regulation, leading to a loss of economic competitiveness for UK businesses. Most Remain 
supporters put forward a very different case, arguing that EU social policy has led to the 
strengthening of workers’ rights in areas such as equality, and health and safety and that 
employment protection will be diminished even further as a result of Brexit.   
A feature of these sharply contrasting accounts of the employment relations consequences of 
Brexit is that very often they are articulated in a superficial manner. Strong claims are set out 
in the absence of any supporting in-depth assessments, although it has to be said that Brexiteers 
are guiltier of this shortcoming. As a result, an important need exists for assessments to go 
beyond the rhetoric and present more careful accounts of what Brexit means for a series of 
interconnected issues related to the organization of the UK labour market. The purpose of this 
paper is to provide such an account by examining the challenges Brexit poses for those features 
of the UK labour market that have been affected by EU social policy. At the outset, it is worth 
stating that European integration involves both market-making and institution-build ing 
processes.  Thus, the paper focuses on the extent to which the market and institutional pressures 
released by Brexit will challenge the British employment model.  
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In particular, we focus on whether Brexit will lead to the end of the free movement of labour 
and if so what will be the labour market consequences for the UK?; to what extent will Brexit 
weaken employment rights in the UK?; what impact will Brexit have on the behaviour of trade 
unions and collective bargaining in the UK?; and finally what will be the effect of Brexit on 
the interactions between London and Brussels on wider employment policy questions. The 
paper argues that the most immediate effect of Brexit is market-related as it endangers one of 
the main engines of the UK employment model during the past decade or more – the free 
movement of labour. Cutting off UK business from a huge supply of cheap labour from other 
EU member states is likely to have a profound effect on the UK employment system. Adjusting 
to such a situation not only poses acute policy dilemmas for the UK Government, it also has 
the potential to create considerable political and economic uncertainty. The fallout from this 
uncertainty is hard to predict in advance. It could open the door to a Corbyn-led Labour 
Government or to an even more thorough-going deregulation of the UK labour market or even 
conceivably to some haphazard muddling-through option.       
Brexit, the free movement of labour and UK’s liberal employment model.  
Free movement of labour, an integral feature of the European internal market, provided UK 
businesses access to a large untapped pool of workers, both low and high skilled.  Up until the 
early 2000s, free movement of workers remained a promise inside the EU: only meagre 
numbers of people moved across member states to work. From 2004, however, this situation 
radically changed. The decisive factor precipitating this change was the accession of what was 
known at the time as the A8 countries – east European countries - to the EU (Donaghey and 
Teague 2006). Figure 1 shows that until eastern enlargement in 2004 only paltry numbers of 
citizens from other EU member states moved to the UK. Then the picture changed completely, 
with a huge increase occurring in the numbers of EU citizens, consisting mostly of people from 
east European member states, living and working in the UK.  
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< Figure 1 here > 
It has been argued that the influx of east European migrants has greatly facilitated the near 
uninterrupted expansion of the low-wage/low productivity non-tradable sector in the UK 
(Portes 2016). For sure, a massive increase has occurred in these sectors: estimates suggest that 
the number of workers in precarious jobs in the UK has grown by almost 2 million in the past 
decade largely as a result of businesses insisting on using more self-employed workers and 
recruiting staff on temporary and zero-hours contracts (ONS 2017). Government statistics 
suggest that 800,000 workers are now on zero-hours contracts whereas there are now 5 million 
self-employed workers. The growth of low wage, precarious jobs is seen as reflecting the 
enlarged role played by low-skilled non-tradeable sectors in the UK economy (Warhurst, 
2016). The UK’s low-wage sectors consist mostly of retail, hospitality, food and administrat ive 
services that employ a third of all workers and produce 23% of the UK’s gross value-added. 
But on average these sectors are 29% less productive than the economy as a whole. 
From the early 2000s until the Referendum, successive governments appeared relaxed about, 
if not openly supportive of the rapid increase in immigration, not least because of the positive 
contribution it was making to economic growth. On the whole, immigration was viewed in an 
entirely positive light as people from different walks of life were seen as looking at things in 
distinctive ways, which would allow new ideas and economic creativity to flourish: the 
equation was that immigration leads to greater diversity which in turn leads to richer 
intellectual capital in an economy. This was the cosmopolitan view of globalization that 
prevailed at the time: nation states and national identities were almost seen obsolete (Collier 
2014). To a large extent, this view of immigration was supported by the assessment of most 
professional economists that large-scale migrant flows, particularly from other parts of the EU, 
was not having a negative impact either on jobs or wages (Wadsworth 2017). Nickell and 
Salaheen (2015) did find a small negative effect of migration on the wages of locals in semi-
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skilled and unskilled service sectors, such as care workers, shop assistants, restaurant and bar 
workers, but other studies found no such effect. Work done at the LSE’s Centre of Economic 
Performance concluded that the areas of the UK with large increases in EU immigration did 
not suffer greater falls in the jobs and pay of UK-born workers and that changes in wages and 
joblessness for less educated UK-born workers show little correlation with changes in EU 
immigration (Dhingra et al 2016). Other research conducted by Dustmann and Frattini (2014) 
found that the macro-economic impact of EU migrants flows was actually positive: in particular 
they suggest that between 2001 and 2011, the net fiscal contribution of migrants from the ten 
central and eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004 or 2007 was almost £5 
billion.   
But this benign view of migration was not the consensus. Outside of London, in large swathes 
of England, particularly in those areas devastated by deindustrialization, concern was 
increasing that immigration was getting out of control. The mounting social backlash against 
the free movement of workers is widely seen as the decisive factor behind the No vote in the 
Referendum. There is no doubt that concerns about the free movement of workers was at times 
articulated in xenophobic terms: much of the tabloid press fermented this view by continuous ly 
cultivating images of hordes of migrants arriving from eastern Europe either to ‘steal’ UK jobs 
or ‘scrounge’ unscrupulously on benefits. During the Referendum campaign, many politic ians 
campaigning for a Leave vote did little to distance themselves from this xenophobic discourse 
while some, shamefully, actively promoted it.  At the same time, it would be foolhardy to write 
off the backlash against the free movement of labour as some type of media inspired 
conspiracy. From about 2004, the hike in the number of migrants entering the UK labour 
market, particularly from the EU, was unprecedented in historical terms. At the time of the 
Referendum flows of EU and non-EU citizens into the UK were broadly similar, which 
traditionally was never the case. Overall, EU countries account for one third of the total 
6 
 
immigrant stock in the UK, which represents a near doubling in size during the past decade. 
These concerns gave rise to a less xenophobic, more dispassionate view that the unprecedented 
scale of immigration was not only atrophying historical communities in the UK, but also 
leading to a rapid and sustained growth in population with negative consequences in the form 
of overcrowding, congestion, pressure on housing and public services, and a loss of 
environmental amenities  (Rowthorn 2015).  
The referendum result and subsequent pronouncements of the British Conservative 
Government and opposition Labour Party suggests that Brexit will result in the UK leaving the 
EU’s regime of free movement of labour. If this were to happen, the implications for the UK 
would be far reaching. Cutting off UK businesses in low value business sectors access to a 
seemingly limitless and relatively low paid pool of labour would amount to a huge supply-side 
shock. The result is likely to be widespread employment shortages and a significant increase 
in labour costs. Hardly anyone disputes that the end of free movement labour will have a 
profound impact on the functioning of the bottom end of the labour market.  Much less 
appreciated is the impact on skilled labour markets.  Free movement of labour not only 
facilitated the expansion of low skilled employment in the UK, it also made available skilled 
labour to organizations with underdeveloped training and skills programmes. Organizat ions 
recruited from outside the UK as compensation for underinvesting in training.   
Consider the case of the nursing profession. In England, there were 361,000 nurses working in 
the NHS in 2015. But in the UK as a whole – the NHS plus the care and independent health 
sectors – over 600,000 nurses are employed. The OECD put the proportion of foreign-born 
nurses in the UK in total employment at 22% in 2011, up from 15% in 2001: in 2014/15, 8,000 
foreign-born nurses were recruited to the UK, mainly from the EEA. Research commissioned 
by the UK’s Migration Advisory Committee concluded that the big increase in the recruitment 
of foreign-born nurses reflects a structural undersupply of UK trained nurses that has arisen 
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due to poor workforce planning, a reduction in the number of training places due to financ ia l 
constraints and inept efforts at retaining nurses by reducing turnover rates (Marangozov et al 
2016). The Committee’s research also suggested that migrant nurses were recruited to save 
costs: in most other graduate occupations, migrants earn on average more than UK workers in 
the same job yet migrant nurses usually earn less than UK nurses doing the same job. Migrant 
nurses are typically recruited at the minimum point on the nurses’ pay scale and their pay tends 
not rise to with age. It is difficult not to see this as pay undercutting. The upshot is that the 
Migration Advisory Committee has been obliged to place nurses on its ‘shortage occupation 
list’ to avoid putting the country’s health at risk (Metcalf 2016). Thus, free movement of labour 
allowed employers both in the public and private sector to underinvest in training and skills 
development while providing them access to the skills and expertise that they required.  
This argument suggests that Brexit is likely to pose formidable challenges for UK employment 
policy at all tiers of the labour market. One view is that any newly designed administrat ive 
system to manage immigration after Brexit is unlikely to disrupt too much migration flows 
from the EU and elsewhere (Portes 2016).  On this account, if immigration levels were to fall 
sharply, vast swathe of economic sectors, particular jobs and occupations, as well as certain 
regions and cities could be adversely effected, some seriously so. Consider London, almost 
40% of all immigrants now live in the capitol and it is hard to envisage how a radical scaling 
back of immigration flows would not lead to severe labour shortages across a variety of 
business sectors, but particularly in retail, restaurant and hotels. Thus, because the UK economy 
has become so dependent on migrants a post-Brexit restrictive immigration policy regime is 
considered a non-starter. If this turns out to be case then Brexit, at least in terms of labour 
migration, could very well be an instance of plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.   
But if any sort of restrictive immigration regime were to be put in place then almost inevitab ly 
significant changes would have to occur to at least to some aspects of existing EU employment 
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policy. One argument that has been made, particularly by the anti-EU populist party the UK 
Independence Party (UKIP), is that UK workers who are unemployed, low skilled or have 
fallen out of the labour market altogether could fill any emerging labour shortages brought 
about by reducing immigration into the UK. On paper, it is reasonable to assume that migrant 
and UK-born unskilled workers could be easily substituted for each other. But in practice this 
would be difficult to achieve as there is a huge matching problem. A disproportionate number 
of vacancies that are likely to arise from a fall-off in immigration is likely to be in the south-
east of England, yet the disproportionate number of available UK-born workers are in the 
economically depressed part of northern England and parts of Northern Ireland, Scotland and 
Wales. Convincing these workers to move to take up the labour market slack in the south is 
likely to be a difficult task.  
Huge barriers stand in the way of large-scale internal labour flows in the UK. In addition to the 
significantly higher property rental and purchasing costs in the South, recent changes to the 
benefits systems, particularly to housing benefits, make it prohibitively expensive for unskilled  
workers, particularly if they have families, to move from other areas to southern England. 
Addressing this matching problem can only be done by the present government overhauling its 
welfare and employment policies. Either it has to abandon its welfare-to-work policy as well 
as its cap on housing benefits to make it more attractive for people to move from the north to 
the south of the UK, which would be tantamount to abandoning its austerity macro-economic 
stance. Or it has to introduce even more draconian welfare benefits so that labour mobility is 
encouraged through disciplining the poor, a policy that would represent a decisive move to the 
‘Singapore scenario’ so ably discussed by Woolfson (2017) in this journal recently. Thus, if 
the present Government wants to reduce the number of migrants coming to work in the UK it 
faces an acute policy dilemma: it either has to increase or lower the social safety net and also 
rethink its entire housing policy. 
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But the awkward policy choices do not end there.  If the Government seeks to restrict labour 
migration to the UK while simultaneously making readily available to organizations domestic 
skilled employees of sufficient quantity and quality then massive investment will be required 
in education and training. Something akin to an institutional revolution would be required to 
reverse the chronic problems of delivering skills and training programmes at all tiers of the 
labour market – witness the current problems that are bedevilling the current apprenticeship 
training regime, notably the high drop-out rates and the relatively poor levels of training 
provided (Kuczera and Field (2018). Government would not only have to abandon its tight 
macro-economic policy – austerity – but key pillars of its wider neo-liberal economic stance as 
firms are likely to require closer regulation so that they actively participate, and not free ride, 
in a new economy wide skills policy. The key point is that leaving the EU’s free movement of 
labour regime is likely to create an acute trilemma for the UK Government. It is extremely 
unlikely that the UK Government can simultaneously end the free movement of labour, 
maintain the expansion of low wage business sectors as well as provide skilled labour to firms 
through migration and continue with its restrictive macro-economic policy stance.  It cannot 
do all these three things at the same time. It can perhaps do two out of the three things – it can 
end free movement of labour, but it will have to overhaul key pillars of its economic policy, 
from abandoning its benefits and skills policies to loosening its fiscal stance, if it wants existing 
performance levels in the non-tradeable sector to continue. Alternatively, if it chose to stay with 
its current economic policy stance, it will have to maintain high levels of immigration to sustain 
the non-tradeable sector.  The only possible way the three things could be pursued 
simultaneously is to mimic Singapore and turn the UK into some type of tax haven in which 
employment rights would be reduced drastically and the welfare and benefits systems 
effectively shredded. This is why the Singapore scenario cannot be fully ruled out.  
Brexit and EU Employment Legislation 
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The EU is not simply an open trade area, but a hard-to-define political structure standing above 
the member states that influences European economic and social life in various ways and to 
varying degrees (Teague 2001). One way is through the adoption of legislation that that has an 
impact on the governance of the employment relationship.  Over the years, the EU has built up 
a body of employment legislation, in the form of Directives that established a plinth of 
employment rights for citizens of member states. It was not envisaged that the EU would 
acquire this influence when it was first established in 1957. The Treaty of Rome, which 
established the EU, was not particularly coherent on employment-related matters. The opening 
section of the Treaty contained some broad declaratory statements hinting that economic and 
social integration should evolve in tandem. Yet, the body of the Treaty contained only a few 
explicit clauses on social policy, in areas such as holiday entitlements, health and safety and 
equal pay in employment (Teague 1989a). 
In terms of employment legislation, the EU did little until the publication of the 1974 Social 
Action Programme, which proclaimed that equal importance should be attached to social and 
economic matters in European construction. It set out a menu of 30 measures that needed to be 
adopted in three broad areas: (1) the attainment of full and better employment in the EU (2) the 
improvement of living and working conditions; (3) and the increased involvement of workers 
in company-level decisions. At the time, the Social Action Programme, which set out the 30 
measures, was commonly viewed as an attempt to give the EU a human face (Brewster and 
Teague 1989). Since the adoption of the Social Action Programme, the EU has adopted a 
considerable body of employment Directives.  
< Table 1 here > 
Apart from the area of health and safety, Table 1 sets out the EU Employment Directives that 
have been adopted. The table shows that a wide range of employment relations matters are 
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covered by these Directives, including equality, employment protection, information and 
consultation and working time arrangements. These Directives cover a range of collective and 
individual employment rights.  Despite a large number of employment Directives being placed 
on the EU statute book, it would be misleading to say that the EU has adopted an integrated 
body of supranational employment legislation that places significant regulatory constraints on 
national labour markets (Grahl and Teague 2013). In adopting Europe-wide employment 
legislation, the EU has never sought to harmonise employment relations institutions or rules 
across the member states. From the very start, there was recognition that the institutiona l 
diversity of national employment relations systems placed enormous constraints on the EU 
adopting one-size-fits-all legislation. Most EU employment legislation takes the form of 
framework Directives, which only set down general principles and rules which the member 
states are able to implement in line with national employment relations custom and practice. 
The Directives on parental leave, information and consultation, and fixed-term work are 
examples of this type of legislation. Deakin and Ragowski (2011) label EU employment 
Directives as reflexive law that do not mandate prescriptive institutional models and encourage 
member states almost to self-regulate on the matter-at-hand, subject to various default penalties 
and derogations.     
Thus, EU employment Directives amount to a patchwork of statutes, with some legisla t ion 
having greater impact on the member states than others (Barnard 2014). For example, in 
relation to the UK, legal rules governing industrial action, trade union recognition, unfair 
dismissal, minimum wages, redundancy payments and shared parental leave have not been 
touched by EU legal influences and stem from the UK alone. In addition, some EU employment 
legislation only paralleled existing UK employment law or required a modicum of reform to 
existing employment existing domestic law. Thus, it is inaccurate to portray EU employment 
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legislation as an integrated and comprehensive body of legislation that constrained member-
states to follow the labour market model of their choosing.     
Apart from adopting legislation, EU legal influences on employment matters also stem from 
the activities of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the judicial arm of the EU. Although not 
a legislative body in itself, the ECJ has played an important role in extending the competence 
of EU employment law through what Weiler (1991) called ‘judicial activism’. For the most 
part, this process involved the ECJ making rulings that significantly extended the reach of 
existing employment Directives or EU Treaty clauses in a particular way. Until recently, 
judicial activism on the part of the ECJ was seen as strengthening EU employment standard 
setting. For example, judicial activism was viewed as encouraging trade unions and equal 
opportunity groups in various member states to try and strengthen existing domestic equality 
legislation by taking test cases to the ECJ in the anticipation of a favourable ruling. Of course, 
once the ECJ established case law on a particular employment topic, national courts would 
invariably take this thinking into account when considering a similar case, further entrenching 
the domestic influence of the ECJ on employment matters. Thus, during the 1980s and 1990s, 
the legal dimension to EU social policy was extended as much by national interest groups using 
the ECJ as an opportunity structure to extend EU legal competence on particular employment 
matters as by the member states adopting EU employment Directives through the formal 
decision-making process.  
 
Although the ECJ can be considered an institutional locomotive pushing forward EU influences 
on domestic employment standards, it is important to recognize that this has not always led to 
an expansion of deepening an EU plinth of employment rights (Brewster and Teague 1989). 
More recently, the ECJ has made rulings that have been widely interpreted as weakening 
national systems of labour market regulation, most notably in the Viking and Laval cases 
13 
 
(Woolfson et al 2010; Bosch and Weinkopf 2013). In these cases, the ECJ used judicia l 
activism to weaken national employment rights systems in favour of strengthening the 
European internal market. In particular, the Court in its rulings opened the legal door for the 
aggressive use of posted workers by cross-border service providers inside the EU (Barnard 
2013), which trade unions lambasted as creating a license for widespread social dumping. But 
concerns that the ECJ was now using judicial activism to compromise national employment 
standards have proven short-lived as in its ruling ECJ Case C-396/13 (Sähköalojen 
ammattiliitto), the Court stated that the terms and conditions of employment, includ ing 
minimum rates of pay, of posted workers would be determined by the law of the host Member 
State and/or by collective agreements which have been declared ‘universally applicable’ in the 
host Member State: in other words, national employment standards would not play second 
fiddle to the dynamics of the internal market. On the whole, the ECJ has used judicial activism 
to strengthen employment standards in the EU. 
 
During the EU Referendum campaign trade unions and others strongly argued that a Leave 
would put established employment rights in the UK in jeopardy. However, amongst legal 
experts, the consensus view appears to be that Brexit will not lead to a ‘bonfire of regulations’ 
and that existing employment rights will remain more or less intact. A variety of arguments are 
made in support of this view. First of all, many EU employment Directives have been 
transferred into UK law in a manner that exceeds the minimum standards, with holiday 
entitlements and maternity leave amongst the most notable examples. As a result, to repudiate 
some EU employment Directives would be, in effect, repudiating domestic choices made by 
previous UK Governments. Secondly, a great deal of EU employment legislation is in areas 
where there is a wide consensus that regulations and standards are needed. In countries beyond 
the EU like Australia, Canada and New Zealand – countries that broadly share the Anglo-
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American employment relations model that prevails in the UK – individual employment rights 
in areas such as equality, health and safety and employee rights in cases of business 
restructuring have been strengthened. Thus, although some UK employment laws have their 
origins in Brussels, in real terms these reflect a type of regulatory convergence – with the 
possible notable exception of the USA - across advanced economies in relation to employment 
standard-setting (Currie and Teague 2016). 
 
A third reason why the UK Government may be reluctant to repeal EU-inspired employment 
legislation is that very soon it will be ramping up efforts to conclude new trade agreements 
with a wide range of countries. Many countries are likely to be reluctant to sign any trade deal 
if the UK government has deregulated even further its labour market due to concerns that their 
domestic employment conditions may be exposed to excessive cost pressures. In other words, 
sticking with its established body of employment laws may make it easier for the UK 
government to conclude new trade deals with both the EU and other countries. Finally, the UK 
Government may calculate that to use the opportunity presented by Brexit to recast existing 
employment legislation would cause too much political controversy. Much of EU employment 
law has been brought into effect by UK legislation, which can only be amended by Parliament 
and a significant political furore is likely to ensue if Government were to introduce legislat ive 
proposals with the intent of weakening employee rights. This is particularly so in the context 
of the 2017 UK General election which returned a minority Conservative government.  Current 
pronouncements by the UK Government that it is eager to secure Brexit in a manner that 
protects employee rights suggests that it wants to avoid big political clashes on the matter. In 
particular, the UK Conservative Government announced in the Autumn of 2016 that it intended 
to pass a “Great Repeal Bill” which would in effect translate all existing EU based legisla t ion 
into UK domestic law but with the UK’s Supreme Court as the final arbiter rather than the ECJ. 
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It would then be up to governments of the day to repeal individually specific pieces of 
legislation on an ad hoc basis.  This legislative tool means the default position will be the 
retention of existing rights.  
 
Thus, the consensus view is that Brexit will not trigger any immediate radical adjustment to 
employment regulation. At the same time, there are some who consider this view to be an 
overly benign reading of the situation (TUC 2016). It is argued that the opportunity will not be 
forgone to make business-friendly changes to EU-inspired employment legislation. Two areas 
in particular are seen as susceptible for downward reform. One is the transfer of undertaking 
regulations (TUPE) where changes may be made to make it less burdensome on employers to 
harmonize employment terms of conditions following a TUPE condition. The other is annual 
leave regulations: here reform may be introduced to soften a relatively recent ECJ ruling that 
made the calculation of holiday pay more generous for employees. These deregulation moves 
may be attempted, but on balance it is unlikely that existing EU-inspired employment 
legislation will be dismantled in any systematic manner. After all, the UK has been able to 
construct unimpeded the most flexible labour market in Europe with these pieces of legisla t ion 
on the statute book. Thus, the body of employment legislation prevailing in the UK is what 
would be expected in a modern advanced economy and the incentives to deviate from this norm 
do not appear to be strong.         
 
British Trade Unions and Brexit  
British trade unions have had a roller coaster relationship with the EU. From the early moves 
towards deeper European integration in the 1950s until the mid-eighties, the TUC, the umbrella 
body for British trade unions, opposed UK membership to the EU. The Common Market was 
seen as a capitalist club that undermined the sovereignty of Parliament and other democratic 
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processes in the UK. A handful of trade unions did support the UK joining the European 
integration project, but these invariably found themselves in the minority (Teague 1989b). 
Although hostile to UK engagement in the EU, British trade unions played an active and 
positive role in reshaping the organizational structures of European trade union bodies. After 
the 2nd World War, bitter rivalry had existed between communist, social democratic and 
Christian democratic international trade union bodies, which weakened international trade 
union solidarity. British trade unions played a leading role in ending these rivalries, which led 
to new unity and cooperation within European trade unions. The clearest sign that the old 
animosities were being left behind was the creation of the European Trade Union 
Confederation in 1973. In addition, a variety of other industry or sector-wide trade union 
federations, such as the European Metal Workers Federations, were set up not only to foster 
trade union solidarity, but also to ensure that the trade union voice was being articulated inside 
the EU’s institutional system in Brussels. Thus, despite being anti-EU, British trade unions 
played a constructive role in organizationally revamping European trade union governance  
(Teague 1989c).  
 
When the UK finally joined the EU in 1973, the approach of British trade unions to EU-level 
policy making can best be described as naïve Keynesianism. Little strategic thinking occurred 
about how the EU could be used as an extra-national institutional resource to advance the 
economic and social interests of British workers. For most British trade unions, the nation-state 
remained the key site for implementing programmes for the UK economy as witnessed by the 
near universal appeal of the version of the alternative economic strategy that endorsed 
widespread import controls. This policy vision strongly influenced trade union action on EU-
related matters. When seeking to influence the character of EU policy, the first port of call was 
not Brussels to lobby the Commission or to develop a common European trade union position, 
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but Whitehall to badger the relevant minister in the Labour Government at the time to adopt a 
trade union friendly policy in their deliberations in EU institutions. Invariably, the litmus test 
used to assess the merits of EU policies was the potential impact on the established voluntar ist 
system of employment relations in Britain.  
 
On a number of occasions, this policy stance got British trade unions into awkward positions 
in relation to some EU social policy proposals. In 1978, the EU Commission made a proposal 
to introduce a Directive to oblige multinationals to set up information and consultat ion 
arrangements with their trade unions. A year later, the Commission also signalled that it was 
seeking to legislate to reduce the working week. On the surface, these two pieces of legisla t ion 
favoured trade unions and employees more generally. Yet British trade unions were 
uncomfortable with both proposals as they were seen as contravening British voluntarism by 
proposing to use legislation rather than free collective bargaining to set employment terms and 
conditions. As a result, rather than working hard to ensure the adoption of the two proposed 
Directives, British trade unions spent more time lobbying for the proposals to be revised to 
accommodate the British tradition of free collective bargaining (Grahl and Teague 1991). 
These episodes highlight the near absence of strategic thinking on how EU action could 
complement, if not strengthen, national policies that favoured trade unions.  
 
A remarkable transformation occurred in the British trade union approach to the EU in the 
1980s. Buffetted by years of Thatcherism, British trade unions flipped their previous anti-EU 
policy and embraced the EU as a possible saviour from their precarious domestic situation. 
Unions hoped that the promise of a Social Europe would roll back the excesses of Conservative 
Government social and economic policies (Rosamond 1993). Jacques Delors, the architect of 
the idea of Social Europe, who did little to quell this idea, was given a rapturous welcome at 
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the 1988 TUC Congress. But the idea that Social Europe would rescue the British labour 
movement from its plight was fanciful from the very start as EU did not have competence to 
make direct legislative interventions in areas such as collective bargaining, the rights of trade 
unions to organise, the right to strike and other forms of industrial action. Without these policy 
levers it hard to see how the EU could have engineered the step change in British employment 
relations sought by British trade unions. Unsurprisingly Social Europe turned out to be a false 
dawn. Holding out such optimism about the potential of Social Europe once again reflected the 
absence of careful thinking, albeit of a different kind than hitherto, amongst British trade unions 
about how the EU could be leveraged to advance the interests of trade unions and their members  
(Wendon 1994). British trade unions had shredded naïve Keynesianism to become naïve 
Europeanists. 
Since the mid-nineties, a lot of work has been done within British trade unions to develop a 
more nuanced policy approach towards the EU (Strange 2002). While some unions have 
maintained a strongly anti-EU approach, they are considerably in the minority, with only two, 
the rail workers’ and the bakers’ union, strongly supporting Brexit. Most individual trade 
unions have generally left behind political driven debates about whether or not the UK should 
be a member of the EU. The TUC Congress in September 2012 voted overwhelmingly against 
a motion proposed by the Rail, Maritime and Transport Union to support leaving the European 
Union. However, the opposition speeches were not framed in terms of viewing the EU as a 
bulwark against deregulation, arguing instead that a realistic and pragmatic approach should 
be adopted towards the EU. In the referendum campaign itself, the large unions affiliated to 
the Labour Party, such as Unite, Unison and the GMB, were unequivocally calling for a Remain 
vote. However, rather than seeing EU social policy as some type of extra-national institutiona l 
White Knight riding to their rescue, the position adopted was based on a recognition that the 
mobilising efforts of unions will to a large extent determine the extent to which EU 
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employment legislation has real influence in UK workplaces. Developing strategic 
interventions with the aim of using EU employment legislation and policies to improve the lot 
of British workers has become the modus operandi of British trade unions on EU matters. 
British trade unions attitudes to the EU have shifted radically during the past 30 years. 
Adopting a more pragmatic outlook towards the EU has been an integral part of the wider 
modernization process launched by trade unions to remain relevant and stave off declining 
numbers. British trade unions are less committed now to the traditional ‘voluntarist’ model of 
industrial relations, which puts a premium on free collective bargaining and minimal state 
intervention in trade union-employer relationships. There is now greater recognition of the need 
for employment regulation to advance fairness and equity in the labour market. Adversaria l 
‘arms-length’ relationships with employers, which so often seemed to go hand-in-glove with 
free collective bargaining, are less favoured than more collaborative relationships at the 
workplace. This makeover to trade union identity in Britain has been both facilitated and 
reflected in its engagement within the EU. Interacting with their counterparts from other 
member states as well as working inside EU bodies made British trade unions realize that 
alternatives existed to voluntarist employment relations. Being pro-European became part of 
the identity-kit of modern trade unionism in Britain, which explains why almost all of them 
were ardent supporters of the Remain side in the Referendum campaign. Brexit is unlikely to 
alter to any great degree British trade union engagement with European trade union structures : 
the TUC and national trade unions are key players in the ETUC and trade unions across want 
this to remain the case. At the same time, a key element of the modernization programme of 
British trade unions has been dealt a hefty blow, which will require a good deal of new thinking 
internally.  A key aspect of this thinking will be to ensure that the trade union movement 
remains outward looking and supportive of having close links with other European countries 
even if the UK is not a member of the EU. 
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Collective Representation and Brexit  
At the same time, it needs pointing out that in terms of EU institutional influence on day-to-
day collective representation activity in the UK, Brexit is unlikely to have a strong influence. 
Longstanding efforts have been made by the EU Commission to encourage trade unions and 
employer organizations to conclude Europe-wide collective bargaining agreements that would 
impact on national collective bargaining systems, but without much success (Welz 2008). As 
a result, domestic collective representation in the UK has remained relatively unencumbered 
by EU institutional influences. This is a point worth further explanation. Attempts at creating 
some form of European collective representation, commonly referred to as the European social 
dialogue, have proceeded along vertical and horizontal dimensions (Grahl and Teague 1991). 
Whereas the vertical dimension relates to efforts at encouraging trade unions and employers to 
conclude collective agreements inside the institutional framework of the EU in Brussels, the 
horizontal dimension has been mostly concerned with promoting trade union/employer 
agreements and cooperation at organizational level. Over the years, an elaborate institutiona l 
structure has been constructed at the EU-level to encourage social dialogue between employers 
and trade unions – the social partners. 
Just what the core purpose of this dialogue should be has been the source of on-going, deep 
disputes between trade unions and employers (Marginson and Sisson 2005). For the ETUC, 
the European social dialogue structure should be mainly focused on the conclusion of collective 
agreements that would commit employers and trade unions at national or even company level 
to particular employment policies and practices. In other words, they wanted a form of 
‘vertical’ European collective bargaining to be conducted in Brussels that would stand above 
yet connected to national systems of collective bargaining. Employers have consistent ly 
opposed the emergence of this type of European collective bargaining: Brussels is not 
considered an appropriate, even legitimate site, for any type of collective negotiations that 
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could produce agreements that bind employers to particular actions (Keller and Weber 2011). 
They envisage EU-level employer organizations performing mostly a lobbying role to ensure 
that the interests of employers are incorporated into any policy proposal made by the European 
Commission.  For its part, the Commission has consistently adopted an open definition of social 
dialogue: in 2000 it said that the social dialogue was a ‘process of continuous interaction 
between the social partners with the aim of reaching agreements on the control of certain 
economic and social variables, at both macro and micro levels’ (European Commission, 2000, 
p. 8). 
These competing visions of the purpose of the European social dialogue have prevented the 
adoption of any meaningful EU-wide collective agreements. In Brussels, employer and trade 
union bodies have only been able to agree non-binding Joint Opinions on such things as 
information and consultation, employment strategies, and education and training, which did 
not make commit or oblige either side to any significant action either at the European or 
national levels. The EU social dialogue was only rescued from descending into an institutiona l 
process without meaning by the Maastricht Treaty (Marginson and Sisson 2005). This Treaty 
gave the EU social dialogue a formal legal base as it integrated the process into formal EU 
decision-making (this legal base has been revised and upgraded by subsequent Treaties). The 
result is that the Commission is required formally to consult European social partners prior to 
presenting any legislative proposal in the social field. The social partners can issue a ‘Joint 
Opinion’ on the proposal, which will be formally considered in the EU decision-mak ing 
process. However, the social partners can bring to a halt a Commission’s proposal for an 
employment Directive by signalling that they are prepared to negotiate an agreement on the 
topic, which itself could subsequently be introduced as EU legislation in the form of Directives. 
Additionally, the social partners have the option to implement any EU employment legisla t ion 
through national social dialogue structures rather than through national law. Incorporating the 
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social dialogue into the formal EU decision-making process has resulted in the social partners 
concluding four agreements that have been made legally binding through EU Directives on 
Parental Leave (1995, revised in 2009), Part-Time Work (1997), and Fixed-Term Work (1999) 
(Pochet et al 2009). But overall no meaningful form of ‘vertical’ European collective bargaining 
has emerged inside the EU. As a result, by definition Brexit is not going to have significant EU 
institutional influences on UK collective bargaining, because there were none in the first place.   
Alongside efforts at fostering a ‘vertical’ social dialogue in Brussels, initiatives have been 
made to develop some form of ‘horizontal’ social dialogue, particularly within multinationa l 
companies. The origins of these efforts date back to the 1970s when a strong trade union 
demand was for EU-level legislation to oblige multinational companies to engage in 
‘horizontal’ collective bargaining. Legislation of this type was deemed necessary as 
multinationals were refusing point blank to engage in any form of international collective 
bargaining with trade unions (Grahl and Teague 1991). The European trade union position got 
a shot-in-the-arm when the European Commission produced the draft Vredeling Directive in 
1980, a proposal for harmonized information and consultation rights in what was termed 
‘complex organizations’ operating in the EU, but which mostly related to multinationals and 
their subsidiaries. The Draft Directive was quite prescriptive as it set out in detail the financ ia l, 
economic and employment information that multinationals should provide to their employees 
on a regular basis. The publication of the draft Directive was greeted with a storm of protest 
from European employers and some member states, led by the new UK prime minister at the 
time Mrs Thatcher. As a result, the adoption of the draft as EU law was blocked in the Council 
of Minsters (Brewster and Teague 1989). 
Over the next 15 years, the original draft went through several revisions and consultat ion 
procedures until it proved acceptable to the member states in 1994 (Marginson et al 1998). 
Renamed the European Works Council Directive, this piece of legislation applies to all 
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companies with 1,000 or more workers, and with at least 150 employees in each of two or more 
EU member states. The Directive is a pale shadow of the original draft as the main intent is to 
promote voluntary agreements on information and consultation in multinational companies : 
individual MNCs companies were permitted to determine the shape and content of their 
European works council provided they secured an agreement with their employee 
representatives. Nevertheless, the Directive was widely seen as a significant development as it 
obliged multinationals to establish European Works Councils to bring together employee 
representatives (usually trade unionists) from all the EU member states in which the company 
operates to meet with management to receive information and give their views on current 
strategies and decisions affecting the enterprise and its workforce (Hyman and Gumbrell-
McCormick 2010).  
Estimates suggest that of the 2,264 companies covered by the legislation, some 828 (34%) have 
EWCs in operation. A number of studies have been completed on how EWCs have operated in 
practice in relation to UK multinationals (Müller et al 2013). The consensus view seems to be 
that most EWCs are only ‘symbolic’ in nature (Eurofound 2013). The trend is for management 
and employee representatives to meet once a year, with management providing a 
comprehensive overview of the current state of play in the multinationals. A common 
complaint of employee representatives is that consultation rarely occurs in time to affect 
business decisions, and at best only manner in which transnational business decisions are 
implemented can be influenced (Waddington 2011). In relation to UK multinationals no EWC 
is considered to have launched any meaningful initiative.  No EWC has been recorded as 
concluding a collective agreement on pay. A few have concluded some type of protocol or 
agreement on a particular working condition such as equality and health and safety, but these 
for the most part are insubstantial (Jagodzinski 2015).  Perhaps, the most optimistic assessment 
that can be made of EWCs is that they have facilitated the development of new transnationa l 
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networks between British trade unions and their counterparts in other member states and have 
created new institutions for management and employees to share information with employees.   
While the importance of EWCs should not be overstated, Brexit nevertheless presents two main 
challenges with regard to how they operate. One is what will happen to EWCs that MNCs have 
established through UK law. On paper, the choice appears to be between a MNC legally re-
constituting the EWC in another member state or using the opportunity offered by Brexit to 
discard the arrangement entirely. It is difficult to know in advance what option the majority of 
MNCs will elect to follow, but for sure it would cause uproar amongst trade unions in other 
member states if the EWC in which they had been participating were to be abolished due to 
Brexit. Some suggest that it would be an administrative nightmare if a MNC sought to 
reconstitute the EWC, particularly in terms of establishing the role to be played by the 
representatives of UK employees in the new arrangement (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 
2017). But it is far from certain this will be the case: MNCs have sufficient internal resources 
to address such potential problems without too much disruption.  
 
The other (related) challenge is whether Brexit will lead to UK employees in subsidiaries of 
MNCs being excluded from EWCs. On this question, it is useful to remember that before 1998 
when the UK had an opt out of some EU employment legislation, including the EWC Directive, 
multinationals establishing EWCs included employees in their UK subsidiaries on the basis 
that if they were going to establish such an arrangement it should be inclusive of all employees. 
Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the majority of UK employees involved in a EWC which 
has been legally set up in another member state will continues to participate in the arrangement 
after Brexit. Overall, it is likely that the involvement of UK employees in EWCs will not be 
disrupted in any far reaching way when the UK finally withdraws from the EU. If for some 
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reason UK employees and unions were to be excluded from EWCs then the already weak 
‘horizontal’ links between trade unions in different EU member states could be diluted even 
further, placing even more emphasis on the TUC and big UK unions maintaining their strong 
input into the ‘vertical’ European trade union structure        
Brexit and EU Employment Policy 
A persistent theme of Brexiteers is that leaving the EU is the only effective way of thwarting 
the efforts of the Brussels bureaucracy to impose unwarranted employment rules on the UK. 
On this account, the European Commission is hell bent on heavily regulating the European 
labour market. But this is an extremely partial assessment of the current direction of EU social 
policy as it harks back to the 1980s and 1990s when British Conservative Governments were 
engaged in a near permanent confrontation with the EU Commission (and other member states) 
on such things as the EU Social Charter. It takes little or no account of how the traditional EU 
social policy agenda of developing employment regulation on the one hand and promoting 
social dialogue initiatives on the other hand has been substantially revised since the early 
2000s, with the Labour Government playing an active role decisive role in the shift (Coulter 
2014). The Labour Government wanted EU social policy to focus less on workers’ rights and 
more on wider employment policy, particularly in the context of promoting the competitiveness 
of the European economy. Indicative of its approach was a pronouncement by Peter 
Mandelson, the then Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, on the eve of the 2001 TUC 
Congress that he intended blocking a proposed EU Directive which would force all companies 
employing more than 20 people to "inform and consult" their workers about major decisions 
affecting them, arguing that the EU should not be seen as a back-door means of winning rights 
through Europe upon which the UK Government was not willing to legislate Other British 
Government ministers toured member states trumpeting the virtues of the British model of 
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labour market flexibility, portraying the workers’ rights agenda as part of ‘Old Europe’. But 
the key point is that at the turn of the millennium the UK government was setting the agenda 
for EU social policy agenda, not having to ward off unwarranted attempts by the EU 
Commission to impose employment regulation of the country.  
The first result of this policy shift was the European employment strategy (EES), first emerging 
in what was known as the Luxembourg process in 1998 and then more emphatically as the 
Lisbon strategy in 2001. The emphasis of the EES was very much on policy coordination across 
the member states on four key themes, employability, entrepreneurship, adaptability and 
equality. At the centre of this effort was the open method of coordination (OMC), which 
required each member state to submit a national action plan (NAP) on how they intended 
realizing the four policy priorities of the EES. These NAPs were then reviewed by the 
Commission to benchmark performance across the member states and to identify best practice. 
The intention of the OMC was to establish cycles of information exchange and forums for 
policy debate in the hope that policy convergence could be secure across the institutiona lly 
diverse labour markets of the member states. Supporters of this process enthused that Europe 
was beginning to learn from Europe (Zeitlin and Sabel 2010).        
Overall, the literature on the OMC process is less sanguine. One view is that it has led to little 
meaningful policy coordination or innovation as most member states assigned low priority to 
the development of national action plans. As a result, the OMC was seen as lacking focus and 
giving rise to a multiplicity of targets that were never properly implemented (Keune and 
Serrano 2006). In the early mid-late 200s the European Commission in its efforts to upgrade 
its employment strategy encouraged member states to learn from each other on the theme of 
flexicurity – an employment policy invented in Denmark and the Netherlands that combined 
the flexible use of labour with economic security for workers. However, the European 
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Commission adopted an á la carte definition of the concept, which opened the way for member 
states to adopt the flexibility aspects of the policy and discard the security components. Thus, 
the EU flexicurity agenda threatened to mimic straightforward labour market flexibi lity 
programmes of some member states, thereby weakening standard employment contracts so that 
these would confer fewer social rights and offer less employment protection (Keune and Jepsen 
2014).  
In what was tacit acceptance of these criticisms, the Lisbon strategy was revised and 
relaunched. The main changes introduced were a sharper focus on job creation, poverty 
reduction and social exclusion and the introduction of a new ‘bilateral in-depth dialogue’ 
between the Commission and member states on a national action programme to complement 
the iterative benchmarking OMC process (European Commission 2005). This new strategy was 
getting into full swing when the economic crisis started. Although the impact of the crisis varied 
significantly across the member states, it had far reaching implications for EU economic and 
social policy-making, particularly for the Euroland. In Brussels, one of the lessons to be taken 
from the crisis was that there needed to be greater EU-level surveillance of macro-economic 
policies of the member-states to ensure the survival of the Euro and to create a stable European 
economy in the future. But as the UK was outside the Eurozone it remained untouched by these 
efforts at macro-economic level surveillance.  
Thus, UK Governments since the late 1990s have been instrumental in orchestrating the radical 
reshaping of EU social policy away from employment rights and social dialogue towards wider 
employment policy. It is doubtful whether Whitehall has been much influenced by EU efforts 
at promoting a more coordinated pan-European approach to employment policy. Certainly the 
new employment policy agenda unfolding in Brussels paralleled the agenda being adopted in 
London, but minimal resources have been allocated to engaging in a meaningful cross-member 
state benchmarking exercise on employment policy. But the really important point is that far 
28 
 
from being under the tutelage of the so-called Brussels bureaucracy to regulate heavily the UK 
labour market, successive UK Governments have enjoyed the freedom to maintain and advance 
labour market flexibility domestically. The massive growth in the UK of zero-hours 
employment contacts, self-employment, part-time and temporary has not been constrained by 
EU social policy.  
Conclusions 
During and after the Referendum the view that seemed to have held sway was that the freedom 
of the UK government to pursue the employment model of its choosing was being heavily 
constrained by EU-inspired labour market regulations. A quite contrasting perspective is 
developed in this paper. It is argued that the EU’s institutional influences on the UK labour 
market has been uneven to the extent that it has not seriously impeded any UK government 
from pursuing its own domestic employment policy agenda. To some extent this argument 
should not be surprising as EU social policy cannot be seen as an integrated institutiona l 
structure that comprehensively governs the European labour market. For sure, the character of 
some UK employment legislation, particularly in the area of individual employme nt rights, has 
been shaped by EU Directive and ECJ rulings. At the same time, it is likely that the enactment 
of a lot of these individual employment rights would have occurred in any event if UK were 
outside the EU – witness the growth of individual employment rights regime in other Anglo-
American countries. Moreover, there are large areas where EU employment legislation has 
virtually no influence, wage-setting, trade union rights, laws governing strikes for example.  
EU influences on day-to-day collective bargaining in the UK has been marginal so it is hard to 
envisage how Brexit will provide new found freedom in this area. Yet, the EU has had an 
important ‘socializing’ effect on British trade unions; interactions in the European integrat ion 
process have had an ‘internalizing’ effect on British trade unions as predicted by Deutsch 
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(1953) so many years ago. These have contributed to the changed outlook and behaviour of 
British trade unions – the move away from voluntarism and the greater acceptance of legal 
regulation, in particular. Europeanization was of a piece of the wider modernization of British 
trade unions and as a result Brexit is likely to have an impact on British trade union identity. 
These socializing effects are likely to be as significant as any institutional effects of Brexit on 
UK employment relations.  
Ending participation in the EU’s free movement of labour regime is likely to be the biggest 
impact Brexit has on the UK labour market. For more than a decade, the UK employment 
model of generating precarious employment in low wage business sectors would not have been 
possible without employers having access to abundant numbers of cheap labour from other EU 
member states. Brexit puts this employment model in jeopardy and as the paper highlights 
rescuing the situation creates huge policy challenges for this Conservative Government. The 
potential for massive economic and political instability is high. The outcome from this kind of 
turbulence is hard to predict in advance. It could pave the way to the election of a Corbyn-led 
Labour Government on the promise to enact radical economic and social measures. Even a left-
wing Government will find the social and economic challenges thrown up by Brexit a 
challenge, such is the engrained nature of the UK employment model. However, a Corbyn 
government is far from assured and the triumph of a right-wing Conservative Government 
cannot be discounted. Under this scenario, a decisive shift to the ‘Singapore’ option of large 
scale labour market deregulation is a real possibility.  Ironically, continuing with free of 
movement of labour, the thing portrayed by Brexiteers during the referendum as the country’s 
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Figure 1: Migration Flows into the UK, 000s 
 




Table 1:  EU Employment Directives 
Directive Summary of Directive 
Information on Individual  
Employment Conditions Directive 
(Directive 91/533) 
 
Employers must notify new employees of 
essential aspects of employment contract 
within two months of starting. 
Collective Redundancies Directive 
(Directive 98/59). Repealed 
Directives 75/129and 92/56. 
 
Employers making 20+redundancies must 
inform and consult employee 
representatives, and notify Government 
authorities. 
 
Transfer of Undertakings or 
Acquired Rights 
(Directive 2001/23: Repealed Directives 
77/187 and 98/50.) 
Protects employees where their employer 
changes as a result of a transfer of the 
undertaking or business in which they work. 
Employees automatically transfer to the new 
employer; terms and conditions of 
employment must be maintained; employees 
may not be dismissed on the grounds of the 
transfer itself; employee reps must be 
informed and consulted. 
European Works 
Councils (Directive 2009/38) 
Employers with 1000+ employees in the 
European Economic Area to set up a 
European Works Council on request, to 
inform and consult employee representatives 
about “transnational issues”. 
Information and Consultation of 
Employees (Directive 2002/14) 
Employers with 50+ employees to set up 
arrangements for informing and consult ing 
employees or their representatives about the 
business 
Equal Opportunities and Treatment of Men 
and Women Directive (“recast”) 
(Directive 2006/54). 
Prohibits discrimination on grounds of sex 
with regard to pay, social security schemes, 
recruitment, employment and working 
conditions, promotion, dismissal and 
training. Also gives the right to return to the 
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same or an equivalent job after maternity 
leave.  
Equal treatment irrespective of racial or 
ethnic origin Council (Directive 2000/43) 
Prohibits discrimination on grounds of race 
or ethnic origin with regard to recruitment, 
employment and working conditions, 
promotion, training, pay, dismissal, social 
protection and more 
Framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation (Directive 
2000/78) 
Prohibits discrimination on grounds of 
religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation with regard to recruitment, 
employment and working conditions, 
promotion, training, pay, and dismissal. Also 
requires employers to make reasonable 
accommodation for disabled employees 
unless it would impose a disproportiona te 
burden 
on the employer. 
Parental Leave (Directive 2010/18) A right to 4 months’ unpaid time off for each 
parent of a child aged up to 8 (actual age to 
be determined by each Member States – UK 
says 5, to be extended to 18). A right to 
unpaid time off for urgent family reasons in 
cases of sickness or accident. A right to 
return to the same or an equivalent job, and 
to request changes to working hours or 
patterns. 
Part Time Work (Directive 97/81) Prohibits less favourable treatment of part-
time workers compared to fulltime workers. 
Requires employers to consider requests to 
transfer from part-time to full-time work and 
vice versa, to give all workers information on 
part- and full-time job opportunities, and to 
facilitate part-time workers’ access to 
training 
Fixed Term Work (Directive 99/70) Prohibits less favourable treatment of fixed-
term workers compared to permanent 
workers. Restricts the use of successive 
fixed-term contracts. Requires employers to 
give fixed-term workers information on 
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permanent job opportunities and access to 
training 
Temporary agency workers (Directive 
2008/104) 
Requires equal treatment of agency workers 
in respect of pay, working time and annual 
leave, plus access to collective facilities and 
permanent job opportunities at the hirer.  
Posting of Workers (Directive 96/71) Minimum terms and conditions laid down by 
law must apply to employees temporarily 
posted from another Member State. Applies 
Legislation on relevant employment rights 
(for example working time, paid annual 
leave, minimum pay, health & safety) 
Pregnant Workers (Directive 92/85) Protects women who are pregnant, have 
recently given birth or are breast-feeding – at 
least 14 weeks’ maternity leave (paid at least 
at sick pay rates), a right to paid time off to 
attend ante-natal examinations, a prohibit ion 
on night work, protection against 
discriminatory dismissal, and protection 
against health and safety risks. 
Working Time (Directive 2003/88). Regulates working hours, night work, rest 
breaks and annual leave. 
 
  
       
   
 
